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I propose a new class of interpretations, real world interpretations, of the quantum theory of
closed systems. These interpretations postulate a preferred factorization of Hilbert space and pre-
ferred projective measurements on one factor. They give a mathematical characterisation of the
different possible worlds arising in an evolving closed quantum system, in which each possible world
corresponds to a (generally mixed) evolving quantum state. In a realistic model, the states corre-
sponding to different worlds should be expected to tend towards orthogonality as different possible
quasiclassical structures emerge or as measurement-like interactions produce different classical out-
comes. However, as the worlds have a precise mathematical definition, real world interpretations
need no definition of quasiclassicality, measurement, or other concepts whose imprecision is prob-
lematic in other interpretational approaches. It is natural to postulate that precisely one world is
chosen randomly, using the natural probability distribution, as the world realised in Nature, and
that this world’s mathematical characterisation is a complete description of reality.
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to define a new class of interpretations of quantum theory. These interpretations are
defined in their own terms and stand or fall on their own merits. However, one way to motivate them, which I find
helpful and hope readers also may, is to start from the idea that the unitarily evolving quantum state of a closed
system somehow branches into different possible worlds, to note some of the problems with this idea as traditionally
understood, and then to consider a new approach to these problems.
The idea of branching worlds is, of course, traditionally associated with many-worlds interpretations of quantum
theory. According to a traditionally popular view of many-worlds interpretations, a branch is supposed to separate
into a number of sub-branches whenever a quantum measurement takes place, with these sub-branches corresponding
to different measurement outcomes. More generally, different branches are supposed to be defined by different classical
events, whether or not these events are associated with quantum measurements as traditionally defined.
Some Everettians, it should be noted, argue that the universal wave function can and should be interpreted differ-
ently, and in particular that a many-worlds interpretation need not invoke the notion of branching at a fundamental
level. This paper does not engage in that debate, since it is not relevant to our discussion. The interpretation of quan-
tum theory proposed here is fundamentally different from Everett’s and other previously proposed interpretational
ideas (for example [1–8]), though it has some features in common with some of them.
That said, the mathematical definitions of branching given below should also be of interest even to a convinced
believer in purely unitary quantum mechanics who sees no fundamental role for branchings. They can be interpreted
purely phenomenologically, as attempts to define a branching structure for a quantum theory of cosmology, in such
a way that the structure tends to contain quasiclassical worlds, to the extent that the cosmological theory allows.
Even those who are not persuaded that a quasiclassical world need be defined by fundamental laws acknowledge
that, at any rate, we experience such a world, and that we need to be able to characterise such worlds in order to
test fundamental theory against our experience. To do this, we need a procedure which starts from the theory and
generates descriptions of such worlds, thus allowing us to derive statements of the form “A quasiclassical world has
property X with probability p, according to our theory.” It would be very useful if this procedure could be defined
by a mathematical algorithm. Our definitions of branching structures are proposals for algorithms of this type.
Returning to our fundamental goal – offering a new class of interpretations of quantum theory – as already noted,
we discuss several possible candidates for algorithms defining branching structures. These are not intended to define
a perspectival view of quantum theory incorporating several equally valid alternative descriptions of reality. Our idea
is rather that, if this programme is correct, Nature has chosen one particular algorithm – one of our candidates – to
describe reality. If it turns out that no candidate gives an empirically correct description of quasiclassical worlds within
realistic models, then the programme will have failed (at least in its original ambition). If precisely one candidate
does so, the programme will have succeeded completely. If more than one does so, and we cannot find any compelling
principle explaining why Nature should have preferred one over the others, nor any empirical test that selects among
them, then we would argue that the programme has succeeded – it would, after all, give a realistic one world Lorentz
2invariant description of reality compatible with quantum theory and with experiment and observation, which we need
and do not currently have. But it would leave our understanding incomplete, in the sense that some choices are left
undetermined.
INTERPRETING A BRANCHING STRUCTURE
Many worlds or one?
As Bell [9] and (probably many) others [10] have noted, if the branching of worlds were precisely and objectively
defined, a many worlds interpretation would seem unnecessarily extravagant. Given a precisely defined branching
structure, we can just as easily define a one world interpretation of quantum theory.
To flesh this out, let us suppose that we indeed have an algorithm for defining a branching structure for the universal
wave function, given a formulation of quantum theory, an initial state ψ(0) at t = 0, and a Hamiltonian H . For the
purposes of this illustration, we follow a traditional view of a branching structure, taking it to be a process by which
the unitarily evolving wave function is divided into a sum of components at some time t1, each component then evolves
unitarily but may further sub-divide at some later time, from which point the sub-components then unitarily evolve
until such time as they sub-divide into sub-sub-components, and so on. On this view, by definition, branches remain
independent: they are not allowed to merge again after dividing. Suppose too that the branching structure becomes
asympotically constant – in other words that the number of branches becomes constant – as t→∞, and that we can
apply the algorithm in the asymptotic limit to obtain a complete list of branches Bj .
Each branch is then uniquely identified by a final component, that is, one which will undergo no further sub-division:
the branch can be identified throughout time by following the branching diagram backwards from the final states.
Each branch Bj thus defines an unnormalised pure quantum state ψj(t) at each time t, which can be identified from
the final component by following the branch backwards and taking the component corresponding to the branch at any
given time. The branch states need not be, and generally will not be, orthogonal at every time t: in particular, before
any given sub-division, all branches whose final components ultimately arise from that sub-division will have the same
branch state. However, we suppose that asymptotically the branch states define an orthogonal decomposition of ψ(t),
so that
lim
t→∞
(ψ(t) −
∑
j
ψj(t)) = 0
and
lim
t→∞
(ψj(t), ψj′ (t)) = pjδjj′ ,
where the pj are constants.
We can then define the probability p(Bj) of each branch Bj by the Born rule. If the relevant states also have
asymptotic limits, so that we can define
ψ∞ = lim
t→∞
exp(−iHt/~)ψ(0) ,
and
ψ∞j = limt→∞
ψj(t) ,
we have
(ψ∞j , ψ
∞
j ) = p(Bj) = (ψ
∞, ψ∞j ) = pj .
More generally, so long as the relevant inner product has an asymptotic limit, we can define
p(Bj) = lim
t→∞
(ψ(t), ψj(t)) , (1)
where ψ(t) = exp(−iHt/~)ψ(0) is the unitarily evolved state at time t.
If these assumptions — the existence of a precisely defined branching structure and the existence of the relevant
asymptotic limits — held, then a perfectly sensible interpretation of the mathematics would be to postulate that
3precisely one branch is randomly chosen, via the Born rule probability distribution, and that this branch alone is
realised in Nature.
Clearly, this would be more economical than a many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory, even if (which is
hotly contested [11, 12]) we could make recover all the predictions of standard quantum theory from many-worlds
quantum theory. Here, just one branch would be realised in Nature, rather than all. It would also make clear what the
Born probabilities are probabilities of. In contrast, it is (at the very least) less immediately clear that many-worlds
interpretations can find a sensible role for Born probabilities: whatever p(Bj) might possibly be [17] in a many-worlds
interpretation, it clearly cannot be the probability of reality being described by the branch Bj , since all the branches
are equally real.
That said, the aim here is not to argue that, given our starting assumptions, the one-world view is demonstrably
correct and the many-worlds view completely indefensible. These questions are considered in detail elsewhere [11, 12].
The point here is simply to observe that the one-world view appears natural. The one-world view is not actually
logically necessary to motivate all the interpretational ideas that we set out below. However, it will be adopted from
here on, on the grounds that it is both pedagogically helpful and fundamentally appealing.
Next we examine some standard intuitions about the form of the branching structure.
Do measurement theory and decoherence alone allow us to define a satisfactory one-world interpretation?
It might perhaps (though naively) be argued that we can go on to sketch a satisfactory interpretation of quantum
theory, by defining the branching structure as follows.
First, suppose that each sub-branching — each point at which a branch splits into two or more — corresponds to a
quantum measurement type interaction. Then in principle we can define the entire branching tree in a cosmological
theory by listing all the quantum measurement-type interactions. Each elementary branch can then be defined by
listing a consistent set of possible outcomes of all the measurements encountered on some branching path from the
initial to the final time. If we apply the Born probability rule as above, then precisely one branch is picked out as
corresponding to reality, and hence precisely one set of consistent measurement outcomes is realised.
Now, standard decoherence arguments tell us that we can calculate the probabilities of quantum measurement
outcomes at any point after they have been classically recorded, and that the answers will be essentially constant after
that point. In particular, the final time Born probability rule (1) for branches gives essentially the same probability
for the set of measurement outcomes as that predicted by Copenhagen quantum mechanics. Thus, it might be argued,
we can derive the standard Copenhagen Born rule probabilities for individual measurement events from the final time
Born rule for branches, since we have postulated that branchings correspond to quantum measurements. Hence, the
argument runs, we have outlined an interpretation of quantum theory which treats the universe as a closed quantum
system and which explains both why we see a quasiclassical world and why the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
theory describes the outcomes of our experiments within that world.
Problems with naive definitions of branching
This is too glib, though. Invoking a “quantum measurement type interaction” as a fundamental notion reproduces
one of the unsatisfactory features of the Copenhagen interpretation. We may think we know roughly what we mean
by the term, but we don’t have a precise definition. And how can this explanation work without one? Is a cosmic
committee meant to survey the evolution of the universe and decide case by case whether, and if so precisely when,
a measurement took place?
In any case, the notion of quantum measurement isn’t sufficiently general to produce a realistic interpretation of a
quantum theory of cosmology. All the quasi-classical objects and structures in our universe, including all measuring
devices, natural and artificial, emerged from a purely quantum initial state.[18] The emergence of quasiclassical
structure from a quantum state doesn’t correspond to a quantum measurement interaction in any standard sense
of the phrase. Yet, without an account of this process, we can’t begin to justify an account of the world as it now
appears or the measurement devices and classical records it now contains.
This is a deeper problem than seems to be generally recognised. The set of possible quasi-classical structures that
could have emerged from the initial state of our universe is, presumably, a continuous set, not a discrete one, at least
if space-time itself is continuous. The peak of the Moon’s centre of mass wave function could have been epsilonically
further away from that of the Earth, our galaxy’s relative momentum to its neighbours could have been slightly
different, and so on. All these possible quasi-classical structures are ultimately defined by quantum states. So we
4cannot hope to identify classically distinct possible final outcomes within a cosmological theory simply by inspection;
we need to find a definition that makes sense within quantum theory.
We could try to solve this problem mathematically by defining a complete set of mutually exclusive quasi-classical
states, from which precisely one is realised, if we had some natural mathematical prescription; for instance, a natural
projective decomposition on the subspace spanned by all the quasi-classical states. However, the notion of quasi-
classicality doesn’t, per se, supply such a prescription.
Another consequence of the continuous multiplicity of quasi-classical structures is that it is hard to define precisely
what we mean by a particular experiment in the context of a continuum of possible cosmologies — and so labelling
the Everett branches of a cosmology by the outcome of an experiment is much more problematic than it first appears.
Would an instantiation of the experiment in an alternative quasiclassical world with the Moon’s centre-of-mass wave-
function peak very slightly further away from the Earth’s count as the same experiment or a different one? What
about an instantiation in which the experimental apparatus is in a slightly different quasiclassical state? Again,
referring to quasiclassicality, measurement, or similarly imprecise intuitions doesn’t resolve the ambiguity: we need a
mathematical criterion.
CHARACTERISING BRANCHES MATHEMATICALLY
We are thus motivated to propose a mathematical characterisation of possible branches. First, we need some
assumptions.
Suppose we are given a quantum theory of a closed system with Hilbert space H, Hamiltonian H and initial state
ψI = ψ(0). In non-relativistic quantum mechanics, we can obtain the state at any later time t as ψ(t) = exp(
−iHt
~
)ψI .
In relativistic quantum field theory with a suitable fixed background space-time, for example Minkowski space, we
can obtain the quantum state on any spacelike hypersurface by the Tomonaga-Schwinger formalism, assuming (as we
do) that we have a field theory for which the Tomonaga-Schwinger solutions are mathematically well defined on all
hypersurfaces. To apply our discussion to a hypothetical quantum theory of gravity, we assume for now – without
worrying about the details – that the quantum gravity theory allows something analogous, i.e. that we can evolve
the initial state to produce sequences of states of the matter and gravitational fields that characterise the evolving
physical system.
It might be objected that we cannot presently justify assuming the existence of a mathematically well defined
quantum field theory that characterises the non-gravitational interactions, let alone a mathematically well defined
quantum theory of gravity. Granted, theoretical physics has not produced such theories as yet (or at least not
demonstrably so). But our aim here is to offer a new way of interpreting quantum theories, not to solve all the current
problems of theoretical physics. We need to assume that we have a mathematically well defined theory in order for
there to be any sense in trying to interpret it. We also need to postulate some properties of the theory. We can’t
be sure that these postulates will turn out to be valid for the final quantum theory of everything, if indeed there is
one. However, they seem reasonably plausible, are not particularly ad hoc, and do in fact apply to some interesting
theories.
So, we adopt the following assumptions:
Postulate 1 The Hilbert space H of the system has a natural preferred representation as a tensor product
H = HA ⊗HB, which is defined at every time (or on every spacelike hypersurface, or for every possible evolved state
in a quantum gravity theory).
Postulate 2 There is a natural preferred complete set of orthogonal projections {Pi}i∈I defined on the Hilbert
space HB at every time. (Or on every spacelike hypersurface, etc.: to save repetition and fix our notation we henceforth
state the postulates for the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics and take the (more fundamentally interesting)
alternatives of relativistic quantum field theory and quantum gravity as understood.)
For quantum field theory in Minkowski space, examples of possible natural tensor products are given by taking HA
and HB to be the subspaces corresponding respectively to fermions and bosons, or massive and massless particles.
(Or vice versa – see the discussion below.) For a quantum gravity theory, possible examples might be for HA and HB
to correspond respectively to the gravitational and matter degrees of freedom, or perhaps to the massless particles
(including gravitons and photons) and the massive particles. (Or perhaps vice versa – again see the discussion below.)
An example of a possible natural projective decomposition (defined via a limit) is the set of projections onto the
simultaneous eigenstates of single-particle position operators.[19]
5Other examples are the sets of projections onto simultaneous eigenstates of momentum operators or of energy
operators. Another example, which depends on the state ψ(t) at any given time (or the state on any given hypersurface,
etc.) is determined by the Schmidt decomposition
ψ(t) =
∑
j
(pj(t))
1/2ej(t)⊗ fj(t) ,
where for each time t the sets { ej(t) } and { fj(t) } are subsets of orthonormal bases of HA and HB respectively. In
this case we can take the projectors Pi at time t to be projections onto the subspaces 〈 fj(t) : pj(t) = pi(t) 〉 spanned
by vectors fj(t) whose Schmidt coefficients are equal.
Given the chosen projective decomposition, we can decompose the state at any time as
ψ(t) =
∑
k
(I ⊗ Pk)ψ(t) =
∑
k
ψk(t) , (2)
where ψk(t) = (I⊗Pk)ψ(t). Here the range of k may depend on time t: for instance, if the Pk are Schmidt projections,
the size of their set depends on the number of degeneracies in the Schmidt decomposition. The notation
∑
k should
be read as implicitly allowing this, and also as allowing integrals over continuous ranges instead of, or combined with,
a discrete sum.
To avoid any possible misinterpretation at this point, note that the branching structure we propose below will not
be directly defined by this decomposition. The possible branch states at time t will not be defined to be the ψk(t),
but rather certain mixed states depending on them: see equation (4) below.
Suppose now that we have some hypothetical fundamental physical theory which stipulates that time runs only
from 0 to T , so that we have initial state ψI = ψ(0) and final state ψF = ψ(T ). We have the final state decomposition
ψ(T ) =
∑
l
(I ⊗ Pl)ψ(T ) =
∑
l
ψl(T ) . (3)
We will define a set of branches with a one-to-one correspondence between the branches Bl and those states ψl(T ) in
equation (3) that are nonzero.[20]
Define
qTl (k, t) = | (ψl(T ) , exp(−iH(T − t)/~)ψk(t) ) |
2
and
pTl (k, t) =
qTl (k, t)∑
k q
T
l (k, t)
.
Define
ρTl (t) =
∑
k
TrHB (ψk(t)ψ
†
k(t))
(ψk(t) , ψk(t) )
pTl (k, t) , (4)
where the sum is over indices k for which ψk(t) is nonzero. We call ρ
T
l (t) the real state of branch Bl at each time t.
Note that ρTl (t) is generally a mixed quantum state and is defined on HA alone.
Postulate 3 In a closed quantum system for which a fundamental physical theory stipulates that time runs
only from 0 to T , precisely one of the branches Bl is realised. The branch Bl is realised with probability
pTl = (ψl(T ) , ψl(T ) ) = (ψl(T ) , ψ(T ) ) .
If Bl is realised, then reality at each time t in the range 0 ≤ t ≤ T is described by the real state ρ
T
l (t).
Asymptotic Hypothesis In the fundamental theories of closed quantum systems that we consider, the quan-
tities defined above have asymptotic limits as T → ∞. That is, the probabilities pTl tend to constants p
∞
l as T → ∞
and the real state ρTl (t), for any finite t, tends to a constant state ρ
∞
l (t) as T →∞.
Postulate 4 In a closed quantum system, described by a fundamental theory satisfying the asymptotic hypoth-
esis, for which time runs from 0 to ∞, precisely one of the branches Bl is realised. The branch Bl is realised with
probability given by the asymptotic value
p∞l = lim
T→∞
pTl .
If Bl is realised, then reality at each time t ≥ 0 is described by the real state defined by the asymptotic limit
ρ∞l (t) = lim
T→∞
ρTl (t) .
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Ontology
The real quantum state plays a crucial role in real world interpretations, directly representing physical reality.
Indeed, perhaps the most natural version of a real world interpretation is to take the real quantum state as the
primary physical quantity, and to relegate the standard quantum state vector to the status of an auxiliary mathe-
matical quantity, useful for calculating the possible realised branches and their probabilities, but not necessarily itself
corresponding to anything in reality. In Bell’s terminology, on this view, the real state corresponds to a beable, while
the standard quantum state need not.
While it may perhaps seem unfamiliar to suggest representing reality directly by a time- or hypersurface-dependent
density matrix, this is precisely what is proposed in realist many-worlds versions of quantum theory. The main
differences here are that we have (a proposal aimed at) a realist picture of one quasiclassical world rather than many
effectively independent such worlds, and a density matrix of generally large rank rather than (as could be possible in
many-worlds quantum theory, given pure unitary evolution from a pure initial cosmological state) of rank one. The
first is a positive advantage, and it is not evident why the second should create new problems.
That said, one could, alternatively, take some mathematical quantity derived from the real state as representing
reality (i.e. as the beable), and simplify the picture. We leave this interesting possibility for future exploration.
The factorization of H into HA ⊗ HB is meant to be encoded into the laws of nature; not an arbitrary choice,
nor an observer-dependent construction, nor a split into system and environment defined for a particular experiment.
Moreover, the degrees of freedom characterised by HB play a different role to those characterised by HA: the HB
degrees of freedom are auxiliary mathematical objects, which do not necessarily have any direct correspondence to
reality, whereas the HA degrees of freedom do directly represent reality.
Correspondence to reality
Why might one hope such a picture can accurately represent the quasiclassical world we perceive?
Role of the fundamental factorization
Firstly, we require that the factorization H = HA ⊗HB allows us to characterise quasiclassical physics entirely in
terms of degrees of freedom corresponding to HA.
In the case of quantum field theory in Minkowski space, it seems fairly clear that this can be done. If HA and
HB are the subspaces corresponding respectively to fermions and bosons, or massive and massless particles, then in
either case we can represent the local densities of chemical species in terms of HA degrees of freedom. We can then
express quasiclassical variables — describing, for instance, the orbit of the Moon around the Earth, or the behaviour
of apparatus and measuring devices in a two-slit experiment – in terms of these local densities.
Though it may seem slightly less intuitive, this is also presumably true if we swap the roles of HA and HB. In that
case, the photon degrees of freedom in HA allow us to characterise atoms and larger aggregations of matter in terms
of their associated electromagnetic fields, and hence to recover a description of the quasiclassical world.
In the case of quantum gravity, the question is, as usual, less clear. Taking HA and HB to correspond respectively
to the gravitational and matter degrees of freedom allows the spacetime to be characterised entirely by HA degrees
of freedom. Since any significant quasiclassical event involving matter eventually has a significant effect on the
gravitational field, this might perhaps suffice (though the scale of the timelag and its ontological significance would
need to be considered carefully). If HA corresponds to massless particles, including gravitons and photons, then, as
above, we can characterise matter distributions in terms of their associated electromagnetic fields, and thus one would
expect to be able to give a direct description of both matter and metric at classical scales.
As we lack both a well defined quantum gravity theory and a clear understanding of the relevant physics as the
universe tends towards its final state, we can offer nothing better than reasoned conjecture. Still, these possibilities
suggest it is reasonable to hypothesise that an appropriate factorization might exist in quantum gravity theories.
Given an appropriate choice of factorization, we can think of the degrees of freedom in HA as characterising a
quasiclassical system, and those in HB an environment interacting with that system. We can also think of ourselves
as, in a certain sense, contained within the system and distinct from the environment. The system and environment
here are not disjoint and separated physical entities: it is not the case that every physical degree of freedom within
7the region defined by our bodies belongs to HA. Nonetheless, all the quasiclassical variables which we assume define
our experiences can be defined by degrees of freedom in HA and, in that looser but natural sense, one may say we
belong to HA.
Role of the final projective decomposition
Part of the intuition behind defining branches via the final state decomposition is that, for a realistic model with
realistic dynamics, an appropriate factorization, and an appropriate final projective decomposition, (i) each possible
final state of the environment characterises a possible quasiclassical history of the system, (ii) significantly different
final states characterize significantly different quasiclassical histories, (iii) significantly different quasiclassical histories
are characterized by significantly different final states. In particular, the effects of any significant quasiclassical event
are irreversibly recorded in the environment in such a way that the record can be “read” by an appropriate abstractly
specified final projective decomposition, such as one of those discussed above: incoming photons scatter differently
off different positions of a macroscopic pointer, leading to distinct final states of the photon degrees of freedom, for
example. The idea here is that unitary evolution acting on any two significantly distinct alternative quasiclassical
outcomes – arising naturally in cosmology, or of a quantum experiment – should produce at t =∞ states which are not
only very nearly orthogonal but moreover are distinguished with near certainty by an appropriate natural asymptotic
projective decomposition on HB. For example, if the projective decomposition is onto photon momentum states, the
intuition is that all the later time quantum states resulting from two different possible outcomes of a measurement
are distinguished by photon momenta, because the background electromagnetic field some time after the experiment
effectively carries a record of the result which will persist to the end of time.[21]
We use the final projective decomposition to define an effective post-selection on the ensemble of possible evolutions.
One way of picturing this is that Nature first simulates the evolution of the universe using standard quantum theory,
with the initial state ψI = ψ(0), carries out a measurement at t =∞, defined by the final state decomposition, on this
simulated system, and then uses the result of this measurement to determine the branch that is realised in the actual
universe. A less teleological and less anthropomorphic view is simply to think of the branches as natural structures
that define a sample space for a fundamentally probabilistic theory, which has a natural probability distribution
defined by the Born rule. This is a probabilistic block universe theory: it simply says that one element of the sample
space is randomly selected, and this random choice determines reality.
Role of the finite time projective decompositions
Suppose now that we adopt the view just mentioned, namely that our universe is effectively post-selected by the
outcome of a final projective measurement at t =∞, defined by the asymptotic projective decomposition. One would
then expect, if we aim for an interpretation that produces a description of reality at times between 0 and ∞, that
this description should be determined by the post-selected final state as well as the initial state.
If we live in such a universe, then we have no direct knowledge of the post-selected final measurement outcome,
of course. But, given a theory which fixes the initial state and the Hamiltonian, we could in principle list all
the possible final measurement outcomes, and use the standard quantum pre- and post-selection rules to infer the
probabilities of our observations (of our own experiments or of other events) conditioned on any given outcome of this
final measurement. Calculating the probabilities of our observations this way, although unnecessarily complicated,
would be consistent with the usual calculations of the probabilities in standard (non-post-selected) quantum theory:
postulating a final measurement does not affect the intervening dynamics or the overall (unconditioned) probability
of any intervening event.
Let us imagine further that a measurement were carried out at time t onHB, defined by the projective decomposition
at time t. If our experience is characterised by HA — i.e. if the only degrees of freedom we need to describe it are
those of HA — then we learn nothing directly about the outcome of the measurement on HB . However, supposing
for the moment that this is the only measurement intervening between the initial and final states, we can infer the
probabilities of the various outcomes from the initial state and any possible final state. We can further calculate a
density matrix describing the state of the HA degrees of freedom at time t, using these probabilities: this density
matrix depends on the final state ψl, and hence (since we define the branch by the final state) on the branch Bl. This
is precisely the calculation by which we arrive at the real state (4).
Now we take a further step. We calculate density matrices on HA at every time t using the above procedure, and we
suppose that we can give a coherent time-dependent description of evolving physical worlds using the density matrices
8ρ∞l (t) corresponding to branch Bl at each time t.[22] Although it fits quite naturally within the quantum formalism,
this postulate does not follow from standard quantum theory. It can ultimately only be justified empirically.
What could constitute empirical justification? Roughly speaking, we would need to show that, given a realistic
model, the proposed interpretation explains why we experience a persistently quasiclassical world of the type we
do. One good test would be whether it predicts with high probability that the realised world will be persistently
quasiclassical and that our world is in some sense typical in the set of realised worlds.[23] A weaker, but still significant,
and arguably necessary, criterion is whether it predicts, with high probability, that if the realised world is quasiclassical,
with large-scale structure, for some reasonably long time interval, then it will continue in that state for a further long
interval.[24]
These properties will clearly not hold for worlds defined by a generic choice of time-dependent projective decompo-
sition on HB, nor will the asymptotic hypothesis hold true for generic choices. The particular choices suggested above
are chosen because it seems plausible that one or more of them might indeed define persistently quasiclassical worlds
in realistic models, and that (for essentially the same reason) the asymptotic hypothesis might indeed hold true in
such models. The picture underlying this intuition is one of an ever-expanding universe, starting from a conventional
big bang and tending towards a “big freeze”, in which, as matter-matter interactions become less and less frequent, so
do unpredictable quasiclassical events and thus so should branchings of quasiclassical worlds. While of course there
are many unknowns and uncertainties, this picture appears consistent with our current understanding of cosmology.
The idea then is that the split HA ⊗ HB and the postulated natural projective decompositions at each time (on
each hypersurface, etc) are chosen so that the projective decomposition at any given time characterises quasiclassical
information about HA effectively irreversibly recorded in degrees of freedom of HB. Each possible outcome of the
final projective decomposition characterises a possible branch, in which all the information necessary to characterise
the final quasiclassical state of HA is encoded in the corresponding outcome state in HB . For each possible branch, we
can define the real state at any given time t, a mixed state on HA defined by the pre- and post-selected measurement
probabilities for the natural projective decomposition on HB at time t. This state approximately characterises the
quasiclassical information about HA that is already, at time t, irreversibly encoded in HB.
The real state of any given branch is thus defined via a procedure that is defined by rules based on standard unitary
quantum dynamics (with a specified Hamiltonian) and on the projection postulate — though the real state itself
neither follows standard unitary quantum dynamics nor standard projection postulate induced state collapse.
Can we, in fact, show that for one of the natural factorizations and natural sets of projective decompositions
described above, it is indeed the case that, to good approximation, in realistic cosmological models, the projective
decomposition at any given time characterises quasiclassical information about HA irreversibly recorded in degrees of
freedom of HB , and the asymptotic hypothesis holds? The question should be, at any rate, decidable, since there are
rather few choices that have any serious claim to be regarded as natural. The projective decomposition most studied
to date in other contexts — in particular in investigations of modal interpretations [3] of quantum theory — is the
Schmidt decomposition. Reasons have been identified for doubting that it generally identifies quasiclassical degrees
of freedom in realistic models [16], It seems fair to say, though, that the question is not yet definitively resolved. In
any case, the alternatives of projective decompositions defined by the position and momentum eigenstates of fields in
HB look very promising.
In short, there are good intuitive reasons to take the hypothesis seriously. We may, in fact, have a relatively natural
solution to the measurement problem, which essentially respects unitary quantum dynamics and Lorentz or general
covariance. The form of the real state also means that it is at least not obvious that this interpretation has the sort of
potentially worrisome “tails problem” that arises in modified dynamical theories in which suppressed components of the
state vector corresponding to unselected quasiclassical worlds acquire exponentially small amplitudes but nonetheless
retain (something like) the same mathematical structure and information content of the selected component.
Detailed calculations in realistic models remain to be carried out; they should illuminate these questions further
and, one might reasonably hope, give persuasive evidence that a well defined real world interpretation can adequately
describe the quasiclassical reality we experience.
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